ABSTRACT: The Navy Probability of Raid Annihilation (P RA)
Introduction
Beginning in 2000, the U.S. Navy's Ship Self Defense Combat Systems Engineer has led the development of a common, consistent process for ship combat system operational evaluation. The key measure of effectiveness (MOE) for evaluation of ship self defense performance is the Probability of Raid Annihilation (P RA ). The P RA MOE is an assessment metric for the combat system as a whole, measuring the collective performance of the various sensor, control, and engagement elements working together as a unit. For various reasons-technical, safety, and cost-the assessment of ship self defense combat system performance, and of P RA in particular, continues to be problematic in live testing venues.
The Navy P RA Assessment Process was established to address these issues, with modeling and simulation in a prominent role. Previous papers have described the testing issues and process origins in greater detail 1, 2 . Technical leadership for process development and maintenance resides with the Ship Self Defense Combat Systems Engineer, now under PEO Integrated Warfare Systems. Important support for development of the Process Standards and Architecture (PS&A) and the P RA Assessment Simulation Testbed has been received from the Navy Modeling and Simulation Management Office and the DoD Director of Test and Evaluation.
Characterizing Combat System Performance
The P RA MOE is the capstone MOE for ship self defense. However, there are multiple objectives for implementing the process to assess this MOE. These multiple objectives highlight the fact that the P RA score is less important than why that score occurs: First and foremost, the P RA Assessment Process provides the P RA ship class results to meet operational test and evaluation requirements across ship classes in a consistent and adequate manner. However, there is much more to be gained from P RA assessment aside from the actual score. A second objective of the process is to provide system capabilities and limitations as inputs to Fleet tactics development. That is, helping the warfighter understand how to defend the ship. Finally, the assessment process should provide combat system insight to the PEOs, Program Offices, and the Ship Self Defense Combat Systems Engineer. This insight into integrated combat system performance drivers is perhaps the most important objective, as it enables design and development of future combat systems to meet the evolving threat. This insight to integrated combat system performance is required irrespective of the existence of the P RA MOE.
Common Simulation Framework for Assessment of Ship Self Defense
The Navy P RA Assessment Process is a sim-centric process, in that the end-to-end ship defense results can only be calculated within the simulation federation. The process implementation therefore requires a defined architecture and set of simulation standards to be successful; hence, the P RA Testbed and PS&A. The simulation framework for P RA Assessment is founded on the following principles:
P RA Assessment simulation execution will utilize interoperable simulations operating on a single runtime infrastructure. P RA Assessment will not be achieved by a single monolithic simulation, but rather a set of simulations representing the ship, combat system components, threats, etc. The set of simulations will not be executed sequentially or independently. Fidelity requirements for operational assessment are not realized by this level of simulation interoperability. Rather, the set of simulations will execute together during a common runtime across a network. A single execution of an instance of the set of simulations will determine the result of a single ship defense engagement against a single threat raid. Multiple executions of the set of simulations will be employed to determine P RA results. Scenario progression during runtime will be regulated by the runtime infrastructure, to maintain the integrity of the SoS representation. Further, simulations must permit the regulation of runtime execution rate to slower than real-time to accommodate computation-intensive simulations of sufficient detail for operational evaluation. The simulations shall comply with a pre-negotiated interface definition, given by the Federation Object Model and Federation Agreements. The negotiation of the specific FOM and Agreements documents for a specific implementation will be achieved via the simulation systems engineering process (IEEE 1516.3 FEDEP).
Common, consistent threat and natural environment representations will be achieved through unified modeling with distributed runtime execution.
The Federation Development and Execution Process (FEDEP) calls for the creation of a common system-ofsystems object model, here termed the Systems Engineering Concept Model (SECM). It is required to identify all aspects of threat and natural environment that affect any of the systems. This is the unified model that defines the physics that must be implemented in the set of simulations. Allocation of these calculations to individual simulation components will be flexible to accommodate legacy implementations and runtime efficiency, provided they do not violate the integrity of the unified SECM. So, various aspects of threat representation may be distributed among the combat system element simulations, as long as integrated threat representation is ultimately achieved during runtime. For example, threat antenna and body orientation, which impact threat radar signature, may be owned within an EW simulation, while other threat RCS data is owned within a radar simulation, as long as the radar simulation recognizes changes to antenna/body orientation calculated in the EW simulation. Similarly, impacts of natural environment conditions may be calculated in parallel during runtime by individual element simulations, provided they are consistent and recognize changes induced by other element simulations where appropriate.
System-to-system communications should be Interface Design Specification (IDS) and Interface Design Document (IDD) compliant.
This means that tactical system-to-system interfaces (e.g., SSDS to CEP, SSDS to SLQ-32) should be as they are on the ship, to the extent that they impact P RA scenarios. The intent is to avoid re-inventing interface definitions that already exist and to build-in confidence in the resulting systems simulation interface. Further, software testing may be improved by leveraging existing diagnostic tools already aligned to the IDS/IDD. The requirement is for the system-to-system communications to comply with the IDS/IDD, however, the entire IDS/IDD does not necessarily have to be populated in the interface. Only those aspects affecting P RA are required.
System-to-system interactions (e.g., signal propagations, radar reflections, emission detections) should be physics-based through the common environment. All system representations must be implemented for the SoS environment, and reflect influences and impacts of the other systems present in the combat system. System representations must be implemented to address threat raids rather than one-on-one engagements. Interactions must be represented in sufficient detail to justify accreditation for use in operational evaluation. This will incur a necessary runtime execution pace of slower-than real-time, to accommodate computation-intensive physics-based calculations. Therefore, the simulations must permit the regulation of runtime execution rate to slower than real-time.
P RA Simulation Testbed Architecture
The fundamental purpose of the P RA Assessment Simulation Testbed is to create a working simulation framework that meets the foundation requirements. It is a tangible product of the Navy P RA Assessment Process development, and it represents a proof-of-concept tool for the Navy P RA Assessment Process approach. 
Re-hosted Tactical Software
Runtime execution details for the Testbed architecture have been previously described. However, implementation of the CEC element is worth additional discussion. The CEC representation for the Testbed was achieved using re-hosted tactical code. The tactical code in the operational CEC runs as real-time embedded software. For the P RA Testbed, the code was re-hosted to a general purpose workstation and interfaced to software layers to handle process calls and clock progression. By using these 'adaptation' and 'time management' layers, the team was able to fool the tactical code into thinking it was running real-time. When implemented in the Testbed, the CEC tactical code ran as a time-regulating and timeconstrained federate, while still executing the operationally correct sensor fusion algorithms and tactical communications with the SSDS and radar federates.
Transferring tactical communications data across the RTI is actually handled in a rather simple fashion. Each tactical data packet passed from one system to the next is treated as an opaque data interaction for the RTI to move between the two system federates. The contents of the data packet not defined in the FOM, as they are already defined in the appropriate IDS/IDD (see Figure 2 ). This approach keeps the FOM information sparse and easily managed, and permits the system federate developers to use existing references they are already familiar with to develop their federate interfaces. Of course, the drawback is that the requirement for deciphering the data contained within these interactions resides with the recipient, making it more difficult for third-party federates to make use of them. This can be troublesome in situations where a small portion of a data packet may be useful to multiple federates, possibly causing that portion to be duplicated in a separate data publication for general federation use.
Portions of the SSDS Mk 2 representation for the P RA Testbed were also developed using re-hosted tactical code (SSDS Mk 1 software was successfully re-hosted during a previous HLA demonstration project 3 ). The experience with the CEC and SSDS federates has been so positive that future implementations of SLQ-32 and radars may follow a similar approach, for example re-hosting SPQ-9B radar tracker code in lieu of a model. This approach of re-hosting tactical code is enticing for operational evaluation, because it is fairly non-intrusive and eliminates the need to 'model' algorithms contained in the code. 
P RA Testbed Products and Lessons Learned Thus Far
Development of the P RA Testbed Builds 1 and 2 have produced significant results, both in the form of tangible products and lessons learned. The culmination of these products and lessons is significant risk reduction for future implementations of the Navy P RA Assessment Process, and therefore less risky and costly ship class operational evaluations.
Products
The Navy P RA Testbed development team has undergone the experience of implementing two spirals of the development process for a ship defense simulation federation. In doing so, they have generated the various FEDEP system engineering products for re-use, most significantly:
• Ship defense Systems Engineering Concept Model • Ship defense federation functional allocation
The team has tested the common simulation framework requirements and exercised the interoperable simulation architecture, both with successful outcomes. They have developed the initial set of simulation modules and support tools, and established secure wide-area network connectivity for executing P RA analyses.
Perhaps most importantly, the P RA Testbed Build 2 implements for the first time integrated hardkill and softkill element representation in the same runtime infrastructure with a common, reactive threat raid representation.
Selected Lessons Learned Thus Far
As is normally the case with prototype implementations, there are a plethora of lessons learned garnered from P RA Testbed development. A selection of interesting and important lessons follows:
FEDEP importance.
Testbed development has highlighted the important role of early stage systems engineering as called out in the IEEE 1516.3 Federation Development and Execution Process. This includes heavy emphasis on cross-element negotiation and conceptual modeling, and is particularly important for achieving consistent, credible threat and natural environment representations.
Re-hosting of real-time tactical code. As previously discussed, the CEP and SSDS representations implemented in the P RA Assessment Testbed utilize tactical code re-hosted in a workstation environment. Reactive threat representations are viable for integrated HK/SK scenarios. This is essential for P RA assessment, and was achieved in both Testbed Builds 1 and 2, wherein outgoing RAM missiles homed on threat ASCMs that were being influenced by Nulka seduction tactics. Both radar federates also subscribed commonly to this reactive threat information, so they could respond dynamically to, for example, changes in threat spacing that could affect the ship's ability to establish a correct raid count.
Experience is essential.
Prior experience was critical in working the timeline that was established for each Testbed build. By leveraging previous experience in developing interoperable simulations, a working prototype of an integrated combat system representation was achieved in under six months in Testbed Build 1. Work that had gone before, particularly in HLA development and in embedded system re-hosting, reduced risk and made the Build 1 effort feasible under such formidable time constraints. Build 2 implemented an even tighter federate development and federation testing cycle, leveraging a consistent set of developers from Testbed Build 1. Maintaining a stable core Navy team will be important in the future for ensuring consistent and efficient Testbed implementations across ship classes.
LAN to WAN transition.
The transition from LAN to WAN was relatively easy, partly due to the fact that network bandwidth was not an issue. Since the Testbed normally executed slower than real-time, network performance did not hinder integration or affect execution results.
Optimizing Execution Time.
Familiarity with HLA and the subtleties of its software incarnation, the RTI, is helpful in assuring that functional allocation is optimal and inter-federate communications are as efficient as possible. The Testbed development thus far has been conducted using DMSO RTIs. It will be interesting to see how this situation improves or degrades with transition to commercial RTIs.
Summary
The Navy P RA Assessment Process will allow combat system end-to-end assessment not otherwise possible via live test events. The P RA Simulation Testbed is providing the products and lessons learned for evolving the Navy P RA Assessment Process Standards and Architecture. The P RA Testbed is a common framework for integrated combat system representation that enables first-ever integrated hardkill/softkill results against reactive threat representations. The LPD 17 ship class has transitioned the Testbed architecture to support its ship class operational testing. Other ship classes will follow, while element programs can use the common framework to explore system performance in the presence of the complete system-of-systems. The way ahead will see the Navy P RA Assessment Process refine the architecture and modeling standards through Testbed experimentation and development & learning from LPD 17 P RA assessment.
